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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
present and vested. On the other hand, a beneficiary has no such
rights; his rights are limited to the policy proceeds, and do not vest
until death of the insured. By this analysis, decedent had only the
rights of ownership to the pension fund, and did not possess the rights
of his beneficiary to the proceeds. Hence he could not transfer his
beneficiary's rights to the marital community when he executed the
community property agreement with plaintiff. However, nullification
of the beneficiary's rights would still result if Washington's community
property law requires that the rights of the beneficiary be dependent
upon either the separate character of the property source or concurrent
designation as beneficiary by both spouses.
The appropriateness of the analogy between life insurance and the
General Electric Pension Trust is subject to question. No direct rela-
tionship exists between life insurance premiums and proceeds; the
beneficiary is entitled to proceeds in the face amount of the policy
regardless of the amount of premiums paid by the insured. The pro-
ceeds of the Pension Trust, however, are directly related to, and deter-
mined by, the amount of the employee's contributions. While the dis-
tinction between rights of ownership and beneficiary rights has this
conceptual support in insurance law, the conceptual distinction did not
exist under the terms of the Pension Trust."
Although the Occidental Life doctrine may be justified by considera-
tions of community property policy, extension of its rationale to pen-
sion plans only exaggerates Washington's deviation from the position
of most other community property states. Such an extension is also un-
fortunate in that pension plans are a rapidly expanding innovation;'
it seems likely that litigation of pension rights will increase in the fu-
ture, and the unwarranted-even if convenient-analogy to insurance
law may limit relief sought, and afforded, to that traditionally available
in insurance cases.
Torts-Liability of Community for Tortious Act of Public Officer.
Washington marital communities have been immune since 1890 from
liability for tortious acts committed by a public officer in performance
1 California has expressly rejected the application of insurance concepts to public
pension plans. Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr.
257 (1963). Two courts have adopted the insurance analogy, without discussion or
citation of authority, in litigation involving private pension plans under community
property systems. Boyd v. Curran, 166 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) (California);
Succession of Rockvoan, 141 So.2d 438 (La. 1962).
14See Goldworn, Pension Plans: Their Background, Current Trends, and an
Agenda for Industry, 25 OHio ST. L.J. 234 (1964).
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of his official duties. The Washington Supreme Court reviewed this
rule once again in an action for false arrest and imprisonment against
a Port of Seattle commissioner. Defendant, an employer ex officio of
the security guard at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, per-
sonally arrested and maintained custody over plaintiff for a period in
excess of three hours. Plaintiff sued the commissioner, his marital
community, and Port of Seattle. Suit against Port of Seattle was dis-
missed, but judgment was entered against defendant and the marital
community. On appeal, held: Prosecution of a marital community's
business includes salaried public employment, and the community is
liable for a public officer's tortious acts committed under the color or
purported authority of his office even though the act was committed
negligently, maliciously, or in excess of his authority. Kilcup v.
McManus, 64 Wn.2d 771, 394 P.2d 375 (1964).
The court thoroughly reviewed the immunity rule's judicial history,
beginning with the decision in Brotton v. Langert1 that a judgment
resulting from the wrongful act of an elected constable could not be
executed upon community realty when the community had not been a
party defendant to the suit. Brotton was subsequently misinterpreted
in Day v. Henry2 because the court failed to note that the judgment in
Brotton had not run against the community. The Day rule became
accepted law,' although an exception was developed in Beakley v.
Bremerton,' based upon the community's receipt of actual benefits of
the wrongful act. Having analyzed the origin and history of the immu-
nity rule, the court stated its intentions in the principal case: "Rather
than await the gradual erosion of the rule by the engrafting of excep-
tions upon it case by case, we deem it advisable to and do abrogate the
doctrine now and hereby overrule the cases which seem to apply it."15
In support of its decision the court cited a community property treatise
I I Wash. 73, 23 Pac. 688 (1890).
281 Wash. 61, 142 Pac. 439 (1914).
s See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Clark, 144 Wash. 520, 258 Pac. 35 (1927) ; Kies v.
Wilkinson, 114 Wash. 89, 194 Pac. 582 (1921) ; Bice v. Brown, 98 Wash. 416, 167'Pac.
1097 (1917). These cases were cited by the court. The only decisions not cited by the
court, in which the rule was applied, are Coles v. McNamara, 131 Wash. 691, 231 Pac.
28 (1924), and Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Garrison, 75 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wash. 1948).
&5 Wn2d 670, 105 P2d 40 (1940). Accord, State v. Miller, 32 Wn.2d 149, 201 P2d
136 (1948). Another established exception, not mentioned by the court, was denial of
immunity in cases of non-elected public officials. Meck v. Cavanaugh, 147 Wash. 153,
265 Pac. 178 (1928) ; Kangley v. Rogers, 85 Wash. 250, 147 Pac. 898 (1915).
5 64 Wn2d at 781, 394 P.2d at 381.6 McKY, CommurNIT PRopsmry §§ 817 at 552, 821-23 at 554-57, 826-27 at 559-60(2d ed. 1925). The court might well have cited MAnaSr, MAmTAL PRoPMTY IN CoN-
mLicr OF LAWS 150-51, 154-55 & n. 69 (1952), in which the rule is characterized as
"irrational discrimination! and an "historical accident. The "salary as community
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and an Arizona decision7 which had thoroughly reviewed and rejected
the Washington immunity rule as unjust.
Unfortunately the decision in the principal case is weakened by its
facts. The tort doctrine of respondeat superior was clearly applicable,
yet the trial court-without stating a reason-granted Port of Seattle's
motion to dismiss. If Port of Seattle was not liable it would seem that
McManus must not have been acting within the scope of his employ-
ment and, therefore, the tortious act was not committed in the perform-
ance of his official duties. If McManus was not performing his official
duties when he arrested and imprisoned plaintiff, the facts of the case
do not support the court's holding that the marital community is liable
for the tortious acts of a public officer committed in the performance of
his official duties.
Having purported to overturn the immunity rule, the court stated
the general rule that "a community is liable for the tort of either spouse
if the tort is calculated to be, is done for, or results in a benefit to the
community or is committed in the prosecution of the community busi-
ness."8 Earning a salary, the court held, is prosecution of community
business. Consequently the community is liable for a tortious act
"under the color or purported authority [of the spouse's employment]
..." even though the act may have been committed "negligently, or in
excess of his authority, or maliciously."9
The decision in the principal case is noteworthy on several counts.
Sitting en banc, the court candidly 0 reviewed and unanimously rejected
a rule having its foundation in Volume 1 of Washington Reports, yet
consideration of the rule was initiated by the court rather than by the
contentions of either party. The court's intention to broaden the tort
liability of marital communities was manifested by its subsequent
decision in Brink v. Griffith," in which the court was squarely presented
with the issue of whether the marital community is liable for the tortious
benefit" rationale of the decision in the principal case was predicted in Comment, Con-
munity Property and Tort Liability in Washington, 23 WASH. L. Rsv. 259, 264-65
(1948). The rule was also criticized in Note, 3 WAsH. L. Ray. 153, 153-54 (1928).
7 Shaw v. Greer, 67 Ariz. 223, 194 P2d 430 (1948). As noted by the court in the
principal case, the communities in Shaw were held not to be liable on other grounds.
64 Wn2d at 781 n. 2, 394 P2d at 381 n. 2. The Arizona Supreme Court has not
been presented with an opportunity to directly reject the rule, perhaps because litigants
could have little doubt of the result.
8 64 Wn2d at 781, 394 P2d at 381, citing LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 42 Wn2d 198,
254 P.2d 485 (1953) for the general rule.
9 64 Wn2d at 781, 394 P2d at 381.
10 The rule was variously described as an "incongruity," a "palpable non sequitur,"
and a "rule which now seems to have little or no basis in reason or justice and is dic-
tated by neither experience nor necessity." 64 Wn.2d at 780, 394 P.2d at 380-81.
"165 Wash. Dec.2d 235, 396 P.2d 793 (1964).
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act of a public officer committed in the performance of his official
duties. Kilcup v. McManus was cited as controlling, and the dictum of
Kilcup became the holding in Brink.
CONTRACTS
Property-Evidence-Oral Contracts to Devise. Nearly twenty
years after it was announced, the Washington court has amplified an
announced intention to enforce stringent technical rules in its consid-
eration of oral contracts to devise. In an action for specific perform-
ance of his deceased employer's alleged oral contract to devise realty,
plaintiff presented an uncontroverted line of evidence dating from 1937.
At that time plaintiff was a friend and neighbor of decedent and her
husband, and was employed as a logger at a wage of $5.60 per day.
Shortly after the husband's death, plaintiff left his logging job and com-
menced operation of decedent's farm for $1.50 per day plus board and
room. Three months later his wages were reduced to $.50 per day, and
remained at that figure until mortgages on the property were satisfied
in 1942. The wage of $1.50 per day was then reinstated and continued
19 years. During this 24 year period, plaintiff took only one vacation
"that amounted to anything";I the rest of his time was spent working
on decedent's property. Plaintiff, at his own expense, erected perma-
nent farm buildings in 1949 and 1958 on decedent's property rather
than on his own adjoining property. "A considerable time" prior to her
death in 1961, decedent made out a holographic will devising her farm
to plaintiff, but failed to sign it. Nine neighbors of decedent gave un-
disputed testimony of her intention to devise the farm to plaintiff. A
neighbor who contacted decedent about acquiring a right of way across
her property was referred to plaintiff to see if he would agree. How-
ever, no witness was able to testify as to the existence of an express
contract between plaintiff and decedent. The trial court decreed spe-
cific performance and defendant administrator appealed. Held: Fol-
lowing death of the alleged promisor, circumstantial evidence is not
sufficient to establish an oral contract to devise. Bicknell v. Guenther,
65 Wash. Dec.2d 726, 399 P.2d 598 (1965).
The facts in the principal case, while failing to establish by direct
evidence the existence of an oral contract, leave little doubt that one
did exist. Plaintiff's uncontroverted circumstantial evidence was con-
' E.g., Jennings v. D'Hooghe, 25 Wn2d 702, 172 P2d 189 (1946) ; Resor v. Schaefer,
193 Wash. 91, 74 P.2d 917 (1937).
2' Biclell v. Guenther, 65 Wash. Dec2d 726, 730, 399 P.2d 598, 601 (1965).
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